Despite its claims to have a better representation individual decision-making under risk and uncertainty, Prospect Theory has not been applied very often to the formal analysis of strategic contexts. In this paper, I analyze an ultimatum game-with war as a risky outside option-both from a standard expected-utility framework and a Prospect Theory framework. Under full information, neither framework predicts war. Bargaining under the expected-utility framework predicts a straightforward re-division of the pie reflecting the capability distribution when the demander currently has less of the pie than its capabilities warrant; this demand exists for any level of capabilities greater than the current division of the pie. Bargaining under the Prospect Theory framework predicts that the demander will ask for less than its corresponding level of capabilities and that its level of capabilities needs to be sufficiently greater than its current division of the pie before it makes any demand to change the status quo. This result follows from the demander being risk averse (since it is gaining) while the responder, being in a losses frame, is risk acceptant.
1
[P]sychologists … study individual vision and sensation, individual thought processes, individual decisions. For the abstractions of their science they are perhaps properly insistent on individual-level study. But social scientists study what people do together. And interaction may well produce a difference in choices. (Riker 1995: 35) Section 1. Prospect Theory and Game Theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a new theory of individual decision-making under risk that they called "Prospect Theory". They based their assumptions of Prospect Theory on a significant body of experimental research that suggested that people do not make decisions the way expected-utility theory (esp. von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) would predict. The "basics" of Prospect Theory are that:
… individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point rather than with respect to net asset levels, that their identification of this reference point is a critical variable, that they give more weight to losses than to comparable gains, and that they are generally risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses. (Levy 1994: 7) The impact of Propect Theory as an "alternative" to understanding individual decisionmaking under risk, in general, and to expected utility theory, in particular, has been large but uneven. It has been large in the sense that many people know about the basics of Prospect Theory and it has been cited tremendously and in a wide variety of disciplines.
1 Among game theorists, there is a recognition that Prospect Theory exists and that it poses something of a challenge; but, by and large, it is dismissed as adding too many complications without adding greatly to our understanding of strategic interactions (cf. Morrow 1994: 44-49) . In short, game theory is more parsimonious than Prospect Theory, and Prospect Theory has not been demonstrated to predict so much better than game theory as to justify giving up parsimony.
However, Prospect Theory has not generally been applied to strategic interaction. 2 Riker's statement above mirrors this observation and the importance to understanding politics of decisions conditioned on the decisions of others. Morrow (1994: 49) puts it this way:
Although such approaches are quite interesting and may prove to be quite powerful, their proponents have not yet demonstrated their general importance to the construction of social theory based on individual choice. … Explicating political theory by using choice theory is difficult as it stands: strategic logic is complex. We should know what we can learn about politics with game theory before discarding it for an uncertain alternative.
This paper is an exploration of the underlying complexities of applying the logic of Prospect Theory to strategic interactions. I do not do so as a "proponent" of Prospect Theory, but as an applied game theorist agnostic-but curious-about the fusion of the two approaches.
I use the framework of an ultimatum game with an outside option of war to show how standard expected-utility theory and Prospect Theory generate different predictions. I demonstrate that Prospect Theory does indeed yield different predictions of bargaining behavior conditioned on different predictions of conflict behavior. In doing so, I also demonstrate that the added effort is very complex. I will let others determine whether the effort is worth pursuing further.
Section 2. The Dearth of Applications of Prospect Theory to Strategic Settings
Political applications of Prospect Theory have been made in the areas of foreign policy decision-making (e.g., Maoz 1981; 1990; Farnham 1994; McDermott 1994; 1998; McInerney 1994; Hudson and Vore 1995; Kowert and Hermann 1997; Levi and Whyte 1997) , economic crisis decision-making (e.g., Weyland 1996) , revolutionary activism (e.g., Berejikian 1992;
Moore 1995), the domestic-international nexus (e.g., Nincic 1997; ), and deterrence (e.g., Huth and Russett 1993; Berejikian 2002a; 2002b) . 3 To the best of my knowledge, however, Berejikian's recent work is the only attempt to meld the experimental findings of Prospect Theory with the deductive logic of game theory. Berejikian (2002a; 2002b) argues that deterrence is most likely to be successful when both states are in a gains frame. He bases this argument on standard two-by-two matrix games in which the values of the outcomes are transformed to deviations from a reference point. 4 Figures 1a and 1b show examples used in Berejikian (2002a: 174) . Cooperate
Berejikian recognizes (2002a: 174n12) that these transformed games are still representations of Chicken. As such, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the games remain (Defect, Cooperate) and (Cooperate, Defect). What the transformation to deviations has done is guarentee an improvement over the reference point in Figure 1a for cooperation; each actor either gains 3 points or 1 point relative to the reference point. In Figure 1b , the opposite is true; each actor is now guarenteed a loss for cooperation relative to the reference point. Thus, cooperation represents a "sure thing"-either a sure gain or a sure loss-in each transformation. Defection, however, represents a "risky prospect" in that the action taken by your opponent determines whether you gain or lose relative to the reference point. On the basis of this set up and applying Prospect Theory's argument that people are risk-acceptant in losses, Berejikian (2002a: 174) claims that "the only acceptable outcome for each state is unilateral defection" (for Figure 1b) . This implies that the prediction for Figure 1a is mutual cooperation since people are risk-averse in gains.
While this argument seems to follow the logic of Prospect Theory, there are problems with the above analysis. First, a "prospect" is usually in lottery form. The only way to have a lottery in a two-by-two matrix game is to admit mixed strategies, something which Berejikian dismisses as cutting "against the very definition of real-world deterrence" (2002a: 176n15).
5 But if defection is an (ill-defined) lottery since the opponent's decision is not known for certain, then cooperation is also a lottery. The critical difference is that the lottery of cooperation still guarentees a net gain (or loss) while the lottery of defection ranges over gains and losses. Finally, no attempt is made to identify the substantive meaning of the reference point.
One might assume that mutual cooperation represents a kind of status quo for deterrence and, hence, a potential reference point. But if that were the case, the value of mutual cooperation would always be zero. It has been argued (cf. Morrow 1994: 48; Levy 1996: 189) that an objective status quo may not be synonymous with an actor's reference point. Even so, it is then the responsibility of the modeler to give substantive meaning to the reference point for a given problem and explain why maintaining the status could be perceived as a gain to one or both actors.
Berejikian has attempted what others have only encouraged. In what follows, I make my own attempt. In doing so, I explicitly try to incorporate some of the assumptions of Prospect
Theory within a game model by replacing a standard linear utility function with Prospect
Theory's value function. Thus, the transformation of the game (i.e., with the value function) still allows for standard game-theoretic analysis.
Section 3. Formal Assumptions of Prospect Theory
The formal properties underlying Prospect Theory's framework for the decision-making process are in its assumptions for an individual's value function and weighting function. The value function "assigns to each outcome x a number v(x), which reflects the subjective value of that outcome… relative to a reference point, which serves as the zero point of the value scale." (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 275) Thus, the value function gives the value of gains and losses from the reference point. The well-known properties of this value function are that it is (1) "concave above the reference point", (2) "convex below it", and (3) steeper in losses than in gains (278-9).
This last property is derived from the assumption that, for a given positive value of x, v(x)
< v (-x) . It thus follows that v(x) < x for ∀x ≠ 0. Kahneman and Tversky then show that v′ (-x) > v′(x) , where v′ is the derivative of v, proving the claim that "they give more weight to losses than to comparable gains" (Levy 1994: 7) .
The weighting function is much more difficult to incorporate into game-theoretic analysis. Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 275) posit that decision-makers have before them objective (or relative) probabilities, p, but then weigh these probabilities using a weighting function, π(p), such that "π(p) + π(1 -p) is typically less than unity." This assumption in particular may not be appropriate for applications in international relations in which war is often blamed on overweighting moderate chances of success (cf. Blainey 1987, ch. 3) . While there are other assumptions associated with their weighting function, I instead assume more generically that decision-makers use subjective probabilities that follow standard probability theory.
Prospect Theory is built explicitly on the idea of lotteries, although Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 276) call them "regular prospects". Specifically, the value of a prospect of x with probability p and y with probability q and-implicitly-0 with probability 1 -p -q, is represented by Eq. 1.
As they note, if π(p) + π(q) = 1, then Eq. 1 reduces to the familiar π(p)v(x) +
(1 -π(p))v(y). Since I assume subjective probabilities, I am also explicitly assuming that
Section 4. Ultimatum game with an Outside Option for War
To show the potential power of incorporating Prospect Theory's value function into game-theoretic analysis, I choose a simple game: ultimatum. A standard game of ultimatum carries a risk of rejection, but only as a mixed strategy or belief. Rather than rely on mixed strategies to generate prospects, I incorporate an explicit lottery of war over which the actors have a common belief of victory with respect to side A. Figure 2 presents the game.
Entering the game, both players know the current state of the world (i.e., the status quo) and the probability that A will win a war, p ∈ (0, 1). The game begins with actor A making an offer to re-divide the contested territory with n ∈ [0, 1] going to A and 1 -n going to B. Actor B then has a decision to accept or to reject A's offer. If B rejects, A then has a decision to fight (initiating a war) or not to fight (resulting in the maintenance of the status quo). The status quo can be conceived of in international-relations terms as the current division of a piece of contested territory belonging to A, q ∈ [0, 1], with the remainder, 1 -q, belonging to B. 
. Analysis under Standard Expected Utility
The standard assumption for such games is that utility is linear in the proportion of the "pie" that each actor gets from a given negotiated agreement: U i (x) = x. Ignoring costs 7 , the expected utility of war can be taken to be a lottery over winning all of the contested territory or loosing all of it (normalized to 1 and 0, respectively). Under these assumptions, A would only fight if its probability of winning is greater than its current share of the contested territory (i.e., p > q) since the expected utility of fighting would be equal to its utility of the status quo if p = q.
Assuming this more interesting case, B can be made indifferent between accepting and rejecting A's offer by setting n * = p, where n * is the equilibrium offer. Relying on the typical slight of hand (implicitly based on Prospect Theory), B is assumed to accept this offer from A on the idea that a sure thing is better than an equivalent lottery. Thus, war is avoided and a new status quo is put in place that reflects the distribution of power.
If p ≤ q, A prefers the status quo over fighting. Making B indifferent between accepting A's offer and maintaining the status quo requires setting n * = q. Thus, A's offers are conditioned on its probability of winning relative to a critical probability of winning, p * . For the simple expected-utility case, p * = q.
Section 4.2. Analysis under Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory differs most markedly from expected-utility theory in that the value of options is made relative to a reference point. It has been noted that the reference point need not be synonymous with the status quo (Levy 1996: 189) ; so, I consider a generic reference point, The critical point, p * , at which A is indifferent between war and maintaining the status quo again depends on A's expected utility for war and its utility for the status quo, now guided by Eq. 2. A's utility for maintaining the status quo depends on whether it is in a gains frame (i.e., q > s A ) or a losses frame (i.e., q < s A ). Thus, fighting is given by Eq. 4. As in the standard expected utility analysis, when p < p * , A can make no offer to B that B would accept over the status quo while representing a gain to A. Thus, n * = q.
The function in the gains range may be any logarithmic function; the natural log was chosen because it is better known. That r must be greater than ½ follows from prospect-theory assumptions and is shown in the appendix. 10 This is shown in the appendix. itself. Thus, n < s B is an offer that gives B more of the pie than it perceives it ought to get. We do know, however, that A's offer to B would yield more for A than the current status quo (i.e., n > q). Thus, it is likely that B will be in a losses frame (i.e., n > s B ) for most values of n. The equilibrium offer is given in Eq. 5. [ Figure 4 about here]
For each curve, A prefers fighting if its probability of winning a war is above the curve;
otherwise, it prefers to maintain the status quo. Notice that the threshold probabilities mirror the gains and losses value function curvature. This generates a non-monotonic function given the particular assumed functional form in Eq. 2. One clear observation, however, is that A's threshold probability for fighting under Prospect Theory is higher that the expected-utility threshold for lower values of s A but lower for higher values of s A . Another observation is that the Prospect Theory critical probability is greater than expected utility critical probability at the point where s A equals the status quo. 12 This implies that an actor otherwise satisfied with the status quo (i.e., s A = q) requires a greater probability of winning before it is willing to take such a risk compared to expected utility theory.
While this follows directly from the logic of Prospect Theory, a further implication is that this risk-averse preference is more pronounced for lower values of s A = q. See Figure 5 . This suggests that when A believes it deserves a smaller portion of the pie (s A ) and has achieved that expectation (s A = q), it would risk fighting only when its probability of winning is substantially greater than its current division of the pie compared to when it believes that it deserves a larger portion of the pie and has achieved that expectation. In simpler terms, an actor's behavior would be more conservative when it has already achieved small gains and it does not believe that it deserves more.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Section 5.2. Bargaining Behavior
I take the status quo as a convenient initial reference point for analysis (i.e., initially assuming that s A = s B = q). Figure 6 compares the expected-utility prediction (in bold) with the Prospect Theory prediction (assuming s A = s B = q = 0.5 and r = 0.6). In this example, p
Thus, we see that A does not make a demand to change the status quo in its favor until its probability of winning is greater than p * . Furthermore, even after this threshold is passed, A does not ask for as much as the expected-utility framework would suggest. Changing the reference point, however, we find that this result does not generalize to all cases.
[ Figure 6 about here] Levy (1996: 190) As a concrete example, assume that the ex ante situation is s A = s B = q = 0.5, as in Figure 6 above. Then assume that B has maneuvered a fait accompli shift in the status quo to q = 0.25.
Under the presumption that B "accommodates to its gains much more quickly" than A "accommodates to its losses", it follows that the new situation can be represented by s A = 0.5, s B = q = 0.25. Given this, p * drops to approximately 0.211. Since we know that n * > q and q = s B ,
we know that n > s B for Eq. 5. The new equilibrium bargaining offers are shown in Figure 7 (now in bold), again compared with the expected-utility equilibrium offers. For comparison, the equilibrium offers under the ex ante situtation are also plotted (as a short curve between the other two).
[ Figure 7 about here]
Now we see that A would make demands before it probability of winning matched its proportion of the pie. However, we also see that, in reaction to B's altered perspective, A must demand less from B after a fait accompli for any given probability of winning. Demanding more would lead to war.
Proposition: r ∈ (½, 1)
Proof: Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 279) posit that "the value function is … steeper for losses than for gains" and directly posit that
for the same positive value of ∆. Given the assumed utility function in Eq. 2, If A chooses n < q, A would be worse off if B accepted such an offer. Thus, we are left with determining whether there exists some value of n > q that B would accept over maintaining the status quo. Regardless of B's gain/loss frame for q, any value of n > q represents less value to B compared to B's value of q. If q = s B , n > q represents a loss. If q > s B (i.e., B's losses frame), n > q represents a greater loss. If q < s B (i.e., B's gains frame), either q < s B < n or q < n < s B is possible. If q < n < s B , then s B -n is less than s B -q; thus, ln(s B -n + 1) < ln(s B -q + 1).
Finally, if q < s B < n, q is in B's gains frame while n is in B's losses frame. QED
Proposition:
* EU * PT p p > at s A = q for ∀ r ∈ (½, 1) and q < 1. , which is, of course, greater than 2 . For r 1, the LHS goes to 1 -q . The limit of this as q goes to 0 is 1, which is against greater than 2 . As the functions are monotonically decreasing over the range of q, they do not cross. Hence, the LHS is greater than the RHS for q ∈ [0, 1). QED 
